University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Water and Growth in the West (Summer
Conference, June 7-9)

2000

6-9-2000

Environmental Impacts of New Solutions: Two Case Studies
Lori Potter
Michael Freeman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/water-and-growth-in-west
Part of the Climate Commons, Contracts Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Environmental
Policy Commons, Hydrology Commons, Natural Resource Economics Commons, Natural Resources Law
Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, State and Local Government Law
Commons, Sustainability Commons, Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management
Commons

Citation Information
Potter, Lori and Freeman, Michael, "Environmental Impacts of New Solutions: Two Case Studies" (2000).
Water and Growth in the West (Summer Conference, June 7-9).
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/water-and-growth-in-west/26

Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment
(formerly the Natural Resources Law Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.

Lori Potter & Michael Freeman, Environmental
Impacts of New Solutions: Two Case Studies, in WATER
AND GROWTH IN THE WEST (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of
Colo. Sch. of Law 2000).
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.

fl
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
NEW SOLUTIONS:
TWO CASE STUDIES

Lori Potter
KellyillaglundiGarnsey + Kahn LLC
1441 18 th Street, Suite 300
Denver, Colorado 80202-1255
(303) 296-9412
(303) 293-8705 (fax)
Ipotter@khgkcom
www.khg,Lcom

Michael Freeman
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund
1631 Glenarm Place, Suite 300
Denver, Colorado 80202
(303) 623-9466
(303) 623-8083 (fax)
mfreeman®earthjustice.org
wvvw.ejldf.org

Water and Growth in the West
June 6 - 9, 2000
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER
University of Colorado
School of Law
Boulder, Colorado

Environmental Impacts of New Solutions:
Case Studies
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

New Problems, New Solutions, and Their Consequences

Not surprisingly, increasing demands for water in the rapidly developing West
have put great strains on the availability of raw water supplies both for
consumptive and instream, nonconsumptive uses. One consequence of more
intensive use and reuse of our remaining water is a shift from a water quantity
focus to a water quality focus in the practice of water law, and the increasing
incidence of water quality issues in a variety of forums So, "new solutions" may
be accompanied by a new set of challenges and problems This session of the
conference is designed to address some of these emerging issues in the context of
specific case studies.
B.

Additional Resources
Oliver Houck, TMDLs A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's Ambient

Standards Program, 28 ELR 10415 (August 1998)
Potter, The 1969 Act and Environmental Protection, University of Denver Water
Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1999)
Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens: PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Department of Ecology, 25 Environmental Law 255 (Northwestern
School of Law of Lewis & Clark College) (Spring 1995)

II. CITY OF DENVER DILIGENCE/AUGMENTATION CASE

In the Matter of the Application of the City and County of Denver for a Finding of
Reasonable Diligence, and to Make Absolute a Conditional Water Right, District Court,
Water Division No. 1, Case No. 96-CW-145.
A.

Facts

Denver applied for an absolute decree for certain conditional water rights on the
South Platte River. Thornton, a- downstream user of water Si the Platte, opposed,
arguing that Denver cannot show that the treated effluent it is using to augment
out-of-priority depletions is meeting statutory water quality conditions. Denver is
seeking an absolute decree for a conditional right of exchange. In essence,
Denver wishes to divert relatively clean water from the S. Platte River at the
Strontia Springs outfall and the Denver-Platte Canyon intake, upstream of the
Chatfield Reservoir. As a part of the exchange for this upstream water, Denver
seeks to discharge treated effluent from the Bi-City Waste Water Treatment Plant,
which is downstream of Chatfield Reservoir but upstream of theSurlington Ditch
headgate and a Thornton pipeline that is supplied by the Burlington Ditch.
B.

Issue
When an upstream user (here, a municipal wastewater treatment plant) discharges
in compliance with its NPDES permit, does a senior dovmstream water user have
a claim under C.R.S. § 37-92-305(5) or § 37-80-120(3) that the upstream user is
failing to deliver water of sufficient quality to meet the reqUirements for which the
downstream user's water has been used.

C.

Holdings by the Water Court, Div. 1 1.

Relevant provisions of law.
(a)

§ 37-80-120. Upstream storage - substitute supply - historic.

(3)

Any substituted water shall be of a quality and continuity to

meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has
normally been put.
• (b)

§ 37-92-305(2). Standards with respect to rulings of the referee
and decisions of the water judge.

A change of water right or plan for augmentation, including

(3)

water exchange project, shall be approved if such change or
plan will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons
entitled to use water under a vested water right or a decreed
conditional water right. :r
Terms and conditions to prevent injury as specified in

(4)

•subsection (3) of this section may include: (d) Such other
conditions as may be necessary to protect the vested rights
of others.

(5)

In the case of plans for augmentation including exchange,
the supplier may take an equivalent amount of water at his
point of diversion or storage if such water is available

- without impairing the rights of others. Any substituted
water shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet the
3

requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator
has normally been used, and such substituted water shall be
accepted by the senior appropriator in substitution for water
derived by the exercise of his decreed rights. 37-92-305.
2.

Conclusions
(a)

Denver's conditional decree cannot be made absolute, in whole or
in part, absent proof that the water that it has actually exchanged
meets the requirements of § 37-92-305(5). The Colorado Water
Quality Control Act, C.R.S. § 25-81-101, et seq., and the Federal
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., preempt the authority
of other agencies, including the water court, to establish minimum
quality standards of water discharged into the streams of this state.

(b)

C.R.S. §§ 3740-120(3) and 37-92-305(5) empower the water court
to impose water quality standards higher than the minima
established by the WQCA in cases that include questions of
change, exchange, augmentation or other replacement water; and in
which the evidence establishes that an opposer needs and has used
water of a quality higher than the standards established by the
WQCA.

(c)

Replacement water that meets the quality standards established by
the WQCA is rebuttably presumed to meet the requirements of the
senior appropriator's normal use. The burden is upon the party
asserting the need for higher quality water, to prove that water
meeting the quality standards established by the WQCA does not
meet that party's normal requirements.
4

fl

(d)

Replacement water that is discharged in compliance with a valid
discharge permit into waters classified for the downstream
objector's use is rebuttably presumed to meet the requirements of
the senior appropriator? normal use.

(e)

Proof of such a substitute supply at the point of effluent discharge
shifts the burden to an objector to show that it has normally
required and used water of a higher quality.

D. , Status of Case
Trial to the court began in the fall, 1999; currently is in recess, and will continue
in the fall of 2000.
III. ARAPAHOE BASIN SKI AREA SNOWMAKING LITIGATION

Colorado Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Service et aL, Case No. 00-AP-697 (D.
Colo.)
Facts

A.

Arapahoe Basin Ski Area (known as A Basin), located near the Continental
Divide in Colorado's White River National Forest, is one of the few major ski
•

resorts that do not make artificial snow. The Forest Service recently approved a
plan that would allow A Basin to begin doing so. The private company that
operates A Basin hopes eventually to make enough artificial snow to permit
skiing there almost year-round.

5

This snowmaking project, however, would significantly degrade the nearby Snake
River. A Basin's plan would require diverting substantial volumes of water from
, a stream adjacent to the ski area, the North Fork of the Snake River. The North
Fork flows into the main stem of the Snake River, which is heavily contaminated
by acid mine drainage. Water from the relatively clean North Fork dilutes this
pollution.

While most of the Snake River currently i§ a "dead zone," it does support fish and
other aquatic life below its confluence with the North Fork. By reducing the
North Fork's flow, the project will exacerbate the existing violations of water
quality standards in the Snake River. It also may extend the Snake River's "dead"
area.

Colorado Wild, an environmental group, filed suit in federal court this Spring to
overturn the Forest Service's approval of the project. Colorado Wild charges that
the project violates Colorado water quality standards and thus is inconsistent with
the Clean Water Mt and the White River's forest plan.
B.

Legal Issues

This case addresses the inherent friction between federal water quality regulation
and Colorado water rights law.

Colorado Wild argues that the Forest Service approval of the project violates the
Clean Water Act's federal facilities provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1323, and the White
River Forest Plan. The federal facilities provision and the forest plan both require
the government to comply with the Clemf Water Act and to ensure that federal
projects comply with state water quality standards.

r`)

In addition, A Basin's operator must obtain a certification from the State of
•

Colorado that the snowmaking project is consistent with Colorado's water quality
standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1341. This certification is necesSarY because construction
of the project's water diversion system will involve depositing fill material in the
North Fork and other areas. These deposits of fill material require a Clean Water
Act section 404 permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344. The § 404 permit, however,
cannot be issued without a state certification.
The language of the Clean Water Act indicates that the State cannot issue a

certification if a project will cause water quality standards violations. 33 U.S.C. §
1341.
However, A Basin's operator has water rights that authorize it to make these
snowmaking withdrawals from the North Fork. Colorado law governing water
quality certifications does not allow the State to deny a certification if doing so
would result in "material injury" to water rights. 5 C.C.R. § 1002-82.5(BX6).
And any conditions imposed as part of a certification may not require minimum
stream flows or otherwise cause "material injury" to water rights. 5 C.C.R. §
1002-82.5(B)(4).
A Basin's operator has taken the position that its water rights prevent the Forest
Service or the State of Colorado from requiring that the project comply with water
quality standards. .A Basin also contends that the Clean Water Act does not
regulate the project's major water quality impacts because they result from the
withdrawal of water rather than the discharge of fill material or other pollutants.
But caselaw from the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals (which includes Colorado) indicate that the Clean Water Act does govern
this type of project, and that A Basin's water rights do not shield it from federal
7.

regulation. PUD No. I v. Washington Department of Ecology, 128 L. Ed. 2d 716,
511 U.S. 700 (1994); Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 75-8 F.2d 508 (10th
Cir. 1985).

C. H Status of Case
Colorado Wild filed its complaint on April 5. The Forest Service's Answer is due
June 5,

W. OTHER EXAMPLES
A.

Keystone Ski Area
Keystone reqUested modification of its § 404 permit to allow diversion of an
additional 800 acre feet of water annually for snowmalcing (1,350 instead of 550).
The Corps of Engineers initially responded with a draft requirement that Keystone
study the use of storage ponds to ensure stream flow releases, and warned that
Keystone might have to curtail its water use if the river is cleaned and fish inhabit
it. Keystone holds water rights for snowmaking on the Snake River. The Snake
today is contaminated by metals and virtually a dead river. A joint public-private
clean-up is underway. The Corps' final modification decision waived the study
requirement. Instead, the Corps granted the modification forincreased use "in
reliance on" a MOAKeystone has with the CWCB to maintain a 6 cfs winter
instreani flow. The Corps further advised Keystone that, "When heavy metal
'contamination is reduced to the point that a Viable fishery and aquatic ecosystem
returns, we may reevaluate in-stream flow requirements to determine compliance
with 40 CFR 230.10(c). We will need to meet with you and other appropriate
,• .

parties to determine how to adequately protect the aquatic resources of the Snake
River when the heavy metal contamination is abated."
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L INTRODUCTION
This essay might appropriately be subtitled "A Short Subject" because
intersections between the 1969 Water Right Determination and
Administration Act'. ("the Act") and environmental protection have been
few, quite by design. The Act addresses environmental concerns through a
single narrow prism: the provision establishing an instream flow program
under the control of the Colorado Water Conservation Board (" CWCB" or
"Board" ).2 This article briefly surveys the various efforts put forth in an
attempt to fit environmental issues under the Act's narrow umbrella.
H. THE BACIOIROP: COLORADO'S INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM
In 1973, the Colorado legislature enacted Senate Bill 97 to create a
program with the modest goal of "preserv[ing] the natural environment to a
reasonable degree." 3 The program sought-to fit new flow rights into the
prior appropriation system, a phenomenon that by 1973 had begun to
flourish around the West. These rights, instream flow rights, left water in
the stream. The instream flow water rights adjudicated under the new
Ms. Potter practices environmental, public land, and water law as a member of the
firm of Kelly Haglund Garnsey & Kahn LLC, Denver, Colorado. She represented parties in
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board and City of Aurora
:.
v. Division Engineer of Water District 5, two cases described in this article. .
1. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, Cow. REV. STAT. §§ 3792-101 to -602 (1999).
2. Cow. REV. SrAr. § 37-92-102(3) (1999). ,
3. Id.
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program were assessed priorities "70 years junior to the senior rights on
most rivers in settled areas," consistent with the prior appropriation principle
of first in time, first in right. 4 The law allowed for the establishment of
instream flows by accomplishing two important things: (1) recognizing that
instream flows constituted a beneficial use of water; and (2) eliminating the
diversion requirement for an appropriation of a water right?
A number of water districts soon challenged the constitutionality of the
instream flow program, as well as particular appropriations on the Crystal
River.6 They based their constitutional challenge on the provision in
Colorado's chnstitution that "[t]he right to divert the unappropriated waters
of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied." 7 The
Colorado Supreme Court held that the use of the term "divert" did not
require diversion as a prerequisite for an appropriation, but only negated the
notion that Colorado would follow the riparian doctrine. 8 In short, the law
survived the challenge, but soon underwent the first of several amendments
intended to respond to fears that the program might outgrow the modest
goals initially set in Senate Bill 97.
In 1981, the legislature added four new subsections 9 designed to address
the fear that the-instream flow program would interfere with development
and consumptive use of water in the state. These amendments affected the
CWCB's appropriations in many ways, including that the Board commenced
appropriation of "separate winter and summer flow rates for its instream
flow reaches and divided the reaches to be preserved.., into shorter
segments," results caused by &water availability finding required in one of
the limitations.10
In 1986; the legislature authorized the CWCB to acquire water rights for
the instream flow program "by grant, purchase, bequest, devise, lease,
exchange or other contractual agreement. •" 11 The 1986 amendment
also required the CWCB to request recommendations from the United States
Departments of Agriculture and Interior prior to appropriating instream
flows. The purpose of this was to give the federal government the option of
participating in the state instream flow program instead of relying on
acquisition of federal reserved water rights which were regarded as a far
more intrusive means of protecting the environment.12
In 1987, the legislature‘ amended the instream flow statute once again.
This time it clarified that the CWCB is the only entity vested with the

4. Steven 0. Sims, Colorado's Instream Flow Program: Integrating Instream Flow
Protection Into a Prior Appropriation System, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST
12-1, 12-2 (Lawrence!. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993).
6. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd.,
594 P.2d 570, 571 (Cob. 1979).
- .7. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. 8. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 594 P.2d at 573.
9. Cow. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)(a)-(d) (1999).
10. Sims, supra note 5, at 12-4.
11. COLO. REV. STAT. 37-92-102(3) (1999).
12. Id.; see also Sims, supra note 5, at 124 to -5.
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authority to appropriate instream flows. 13 The exclusivity language
responded to several attempts by private parties to appropriate or assert
instream flow rights, as described below in more detail. *
In 1994, the legislature added a detailed provision to the Act which
limited the authority of the CWCB to acquire conditional water rights or to
change conditional water rights to instream inflow uses. The amendment
limited the acquisition of conditional rights to water rights located in the
Yampa -Basin which the CWCB could use to recover a threatened or an
endangered species as part of a species recovery program and to benefit the
species in a way that an initial appropriation cbuld not.14
Finally, in the wake of the Aspen Wilderness Workshop decision
described below, the legislature once again amended the instream 'flow
statute to specify the procedure by which the CWCB could decrease an
instream flow.15

III ESTABLISHING PRIVATELY—HELD INsTREAM PLOW RIGHTS
Citizen acquisition of instream flows began immediately after the
Colorado legislature enacted the instream flow law. In 1975; a group of
ranchers and citizens in Gunnison County appropriated flows in several
mountain streams and obtained rights to significant instream flows for stock
water, recreation, wildlife, fish, and heritage preservation in the Taylor River
and in eight of its tributaries..16
In 1986, the City of Fort Collins applied for instream rights in the
Poudre River through a reach in the city designated as the Poudre River
Recreational Corridor. The CWCI1 objected on the ground that only the
CWCB could appropriate such rights. The CWCB settled its objections with
Fort Collins piior to trial on the condition that the city, formally delete the
claim of an instream flow use and designate specific, discrete points of
diversion for the water rights claimed. Other objectors continued to oppose
the "thinly disguised minimum stream flow", application. 17 The Colorado
Supreme Court issued a ruling that confirmed the right of the City of Fort
Collins to appropriate both of the rights that it originally sought. 18 The
opinion distinguished' the Fort Collins appropriation, .which incidentally
protected a stretch of river between two defmite points of diversion, from the
CWCB's Stream flow right, which ordinarily signifies the complete
absence of diversion structures.19
In 1992, the- Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a water court decree to
the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District for a second fill of
Taylor Park Reservoir for releases to produce fisher)/ habitat, rafting flows,

13. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999); see also Sims, aupra note 5, at 12-5.

14. Cow. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)(c.5XI) to (III) (1999).
15. Cow. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(4)(a) (1999).
16. Ainended ruling of water referee, In re Application for Water Rights of R.I. Vader &
Sons, Inc., No. W-1991 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 4, Jan. 21, 1975).
17. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915. , 920-21 (Colo. 1992).
l& Id at 933.
19. Id at 931.
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and supplemental irrigation supplies. 20 The CWCB opposed the
application, but here, too, withdrew its opposition once the water district
limited its application to use of previously stored waters for instream uses
within a defined stream reach. The court based its affirmation of the water
court on the fact that the water district controlled river water by storage and
release to accomplish the designated beneficial uses, uses distinct from the
CWCB instream. flow right purposes.21 Interestingly, the court affirmed the
water district's right on the basis that it provided year-round protection to the
fishen? while the CWCB right only protected fish for short periods of
time.22 In the eyes of a CWCB attorney, these cases:
illustrate an alteniative type of Stream flow right recognized in Colorado.
The alternative instream flow right is not equivalent to the CWCE's
instream flow rights since it apparently cannot exist in the absence of
diversion structures. Nonetheless, this right does allow parties to claim an

Stream use of water if the applicant can prove that,previously diverted
water is being Used Stream for a beneficial purpose.4-3

Because these decisions postdated the amendment of the instream flow
statute giving the CWCB an "exclusive" right to appropriate, this alternative
type of instream flow right apparently remains viable to this day.24
IV. ENFORCING THE STATE'S INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS.

While on its face the instream flow program was a near—revolutionary
development in Colorado water law, the program soon received a variety of
harsh criticisms from citizens' organizations, fishing groups, and
environmental organizations: These groups criticized the program for
appropriating very minimal rates of flow and for limiting the purposes of the
appropriations to preserving cold water fisheries, while ignoring other
instream uses such as rafting, maintaining riparian and wetland vegetation,
aesthetics, and channel maintenance.
Organizations and individtials also scrutinized the CWCB for deciding
not to enforce or to protect its instream flow rights in a number of instances.
The CWCB's decisions to reduce or not to enforce its decreed instream flow
rights gave rise to several instances of citizens' organizations taking
20. Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 838
.•
P.2d 840, 847, 856 (Cob. 1992).
21. Id. at 854.
22. Id

23. Sims, supra note 5, at 12-6.
24. In Board of County Commissioners v. Collard, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a private instream flow right acquired prior to enactment of the statutory
exclusivity language, turning back a collateral attack on the water court's subject matter
jurisdiction to grant that water right without endorsing the court's reasoning. Board of
County Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 549, 551-53 (Cob. 1992); see generally
Christopher H. Meyer, Instream Flows: Integrating New Uses and New Players Into the Prior
Appropriation System, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence 3. MacDonnell
& Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993); Lori Potter, People Preserving Rivers: The Public and
its Changing Role in Protecting Instrearn Flows, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN ME WEST

(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993).
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• enforcement action to the courts on their own. 25 These types of actions
culminated in a direct challenge to the CWCB's authority to reduce an
instream flow by failing to enforce the fa effect of the right when a
developer's plans to consume water would have reduced the CWCB's right
below the decreed amount.
. In City of Aurora v. Division Engineer for Water Division Number 5,26
the Colorado Mountain Club and Holy Cross Wilderness Defense Fund
opposed a change in the diversion points of conditional water rights for the
Homestake II water project. The change would have moved the diversion
points further upstream and deeper into a federal wilderness area. The
stream reaches that the city's water rights would dewater were subject to
decreed, junior instream flow rights held by the CWCB, but the CWCB did
not oppose the change in, point of diversion. The conservation groups
•argued that the CWCB's rights-and the federal reserved water rights for the
wilderness would be harmed by the diversions associated with the water
project. The water court rejected the conservation groups' challenge for
three reasons: (1) the CWCB withdrew its statement of opposition to- the
change; (2) the United States Forest Service 'did not oppose the change; and
(3) the Forest Service had imposed bypass requirements on the, affected
reaches, and the CWCB retained lowered instream flow rights there. 27 The
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed those aspects of the water court's holding
but vacated an inconsistent ruling that the state instream flow rights be
administered as senior to the changed points of diversion notwithstanding
the fmdings just outlined.
The City of Aurora` case squarely 'raised the question of citizens'
standing to object to injury to the CWCB instream flow 'rights. The water
court found that such standing existed, a finding not later appealed.
Likewise, a later case raising essentially the same issue received no
definitive ruling by the Colorado Supreme Court.28 In Aspen Wilderness
Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Lithited Partnership, the court found that
"[t]he issue of whether the-appellants have standing to assert injury to the
CWCB's instream flow rights is not before us and we do not address it." 20
The court noted that the extent to which the citizens argued injury to the
decreed instream flow rights remained unclear, but reasoned that since the
CWCB was itself a- party to the proceedings, had satisfied itself that its
interests were being -protected, and did not oppose entry of the decree, the
argument of injury asserted by the citizens was unpersuasive. 30
The CWCB's policies for enforcement of its instream flow rights came
under direct attack in Aspen Wilderness Workshop,. Inc. v. Colorado Water

25. See, e.g., Lori Potter, The Public's Role in the Acquisition and Enforcement of
Irestream Flows, 23 LAND & WATEEL. REV. 419, 429-31 (1988).
26. City of Aurora v. Division Engineer for Water Div. No. 5, 799 P.2433 (Colo. 1990).
27. Id. at 36.
28. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929 P.241718,
726 n.15 (Colo. 1996).
29. Id.
30. id at 726.
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Conservation Board 31 In that case, the CWCB held decreed instream flows
on Snowmass Creek of 12 c.f.s. year-round. 32 Faced With a proposal by the
Aspen Ski Company to increase snowmaking diversions from Snowmass
Creek in the winter, the CWCB examined the year-round 12 c.f.s. flow and
determined that, among other things, the winter flow could be reduced in
amounts sufficient to allow the snowmaking proposal to proceed. 33 The
Aspen Wilderness Workshop filed suit against the CWCB in Denver District
Court pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the
"decision not to enforce the fUll instream flow appropriation ... amounted
to a permanent relinquishment of a public instream flow right." 34 The
district court held that the CWCB had acted within its power to modify its
appropriation. Further, the court held that like any other water right holder,
the CWCB need not enforce its rights or use a portion of its decreed right in
excess of the amount needed. Any such correction by the CWCE1 did not
require water court adjudication.35
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop argued on appeal that the CWCB
breached a fiduciary duty to the public by failing to enforce the . right as
decreed.36 The Colorado Supreme Court agreed. The court found that the
statutory provision authorizing the instream, flow program limited the
CWCB's authority in two important respects. First,: it burdened the Board's
actions by "creating a unique statutory fiduciary duty between the Board and
the people of the state so that the Board may only appropriate the . . .
-minimum amount of water necessary to preserve the natural
environment." 37 Second, once the CWCB adjudicated the minimum stream
• flow, required to preserve the natural environment, it was required to fulfill
its unique statutory responsibility to the public by administering its water
rights accordingly..38 If the CWCB determined that a previously adjudicated
right needed change in order to maintain necessary stream flows, it could
return to the water court to change the decree. But until and unless that
determination and change had been made, the supreme court agreed that the
CWCB's fiduciary duty, to the public barred it from administratively
relinquishing a portion of the instream flow decreed for the benefit of the
public.39,
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop decision precipitated the 1996
amendments to the instream flow law. The decision and the later statutory
modification also caused a flurry of agency rule—making to establish
procedures for appropriation, for-modification of instream flaws, and for
31. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251 (Colo. 1995).
32. Id at 1260.
33. Id at 1255.
34. Id
35. Id. at 1256.
36. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1255.
37. Id at 1256-57.
.
38. Id
39. See Lori Potter, Putting Some Teeth in Public Enforcement: The Colorado Supreme
Court's Decision in the Snowmass Creek Case, 17 U. DENY. WATER Cr. RPTR. 1, 2 (199596).
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addressing the related issue of when an instream flow could be modified by
inundation.40
,
V. TEE QUEST FOR A PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW OF WATER RIGHT
APPLICATIONS

Most western states water codes require that the entity vested with
power to review and grant water rights applications ensure the right will
conform with the public interest or public welfare. 41 Such provisions allow
denial of water right applications if approval runs contrary to the public
interest.
Lacking such a public interest condition in the 1969 Act, a coalition of
fishing, environmental, and citizens' groups attempted to establish one as a
matter of common law as part of their challenge to a major trans—basin
diversion from the Gunnison Basin to the Front Range.42 While these
objectors prevailed in arguing that the application should be denied as
- speculative, both the water court and the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that
a water court is not required to consider the environmental factors such as
effects on wildlife habitat, recreation, water quality, and property values in
determining whether the applicant had proved that the water would be put to
beneficial use 4,3 The crux of the objectors' argument was that the transbasin diversion, known as the Union Park project, would have widespread
and adverse impacts on the fisheries, wildlife habitat, recreation, tax base,
and general quality of life in the Gunnison Basin. 44 Both courts flatly
rejected this objection, holding that "[t]he limited inquiry required to
determine whether to issue a conditional rights decree in this case does not
include evaluation of environmental factors." 45 The court specifically
rejected arguments that the statutory definition of beneficial use
encompassed the public policy of protecting the environment. Rather, it
found that the statutory provision providing for instream flow protection
through the CWCB program was the mechanism whereby the state could
protect the interests of concern
. ed citizen objectors.46 In sum, the supreme
' court directed the objectors' concerns back to the legislature. The justices
stated that: [vi]e have consistently recognized that the General Assembly has acted to
preserve the natural environment by giving authority to the Colorado Water
Conservation Board to appropriate water to maintain the natural
environment, and we will not intrude into an area where legislative
prerogative governs. The degree of protection afforded the environment
and the mechanismi to address state appropriation of water for the good of
the public is the province of the General Assembly and the electorate.
40. 'See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-2 (1998).
41• Lori Potter, The Public's Role in the Acquisition and Enforcement ofInstream Flows,
23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 432 (1988).
42. Board of County Comm'rs v. United Stmes, 891 P.2d 952, 971 (Cob. 1995).
43. la. at 973.
44. Id. at 971.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Conceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of
prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory.
authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based on public policy.
Arapahoe County offered evidence that it intended to divert water from
municipal use; this use of water has always been deemed a beneficial use
under Colorado law and has been given priority over other competing
beneficial uses by the General Assembly. [The objectors] do not cite any
authority that authorizes a water court to deny an application for a
conditional decree because of environmental concerns, and we reject [their]
invitation to creqt; a complex system of common law to balance competing
public interests"

VL THE TWO LITTLE WORDS THAir CAN'T BE SPOKEN
Many western hands have been wrung over the prospect that 'Colorado
water rights would someday be argued to be subject to the doctrine of the
public trust.48 The dreaded day has not come to pass here, however. The
plaintiffs in Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water Conservation
Board were careful to base their challenge to the CWCB'i inaction upon a
statutory fiduciary duty and not a cornmoti law notion of the public trust:40
Nonetheless, the dissent went out of its way to state that " [t]his court has
never recognized the public trust doctrine with respect t6 water." 50 The
dissent argued that "the concept of a • public trust has no independent
content .... Where the legislature has provided statutory directives for the
management and protection of public -resources, those 'statutory duties
comprise- all the responsibilities which defendants must faithfully
t discharge." 51Thus, in the dissent's view,' the • 'CWCB's statutory
responsibilities and its -public trust obligations—if any—were
coterminous.52
In defense of a charge of criniinal trespass against boaters who rafted
* through 'private property, the public trust was advanced as the basis of a use
right to float through the property and to touch the bed and banks of the
river.53 The Colorado Supreme Court made short work of the argument,
concluding that the common law rule giving the riparian land owner , title to
the stream bed and banks was "of more force and effect" 54 than the public
trust principle. Again, the court noted that the argument in essence sought a
change in long-established judicial precedent and, therefOre, 'needed to be

47. Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.24 at 972-73.,
48. See generally Harrison C. Dunning Instream Flows and the Public Trust, INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 4-1 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev.
_
__
ed., 1993)..49. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1255 (Colo. 1995).
50. Id. at 1263 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
•
51. Id (quoting Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
52. Id
53. People v. Emmert, 597 P .2d 1025, 1027 (Cob. 1979).
54. Id
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taken to the legislature.55
V11. IMPORTING WATER QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO WATER
RIGHTS MATTERS

The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the relationship between water
quality and appropriative rights in detail in City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irrigation Co.,) 6 where it held that the water court was explicitly required to
consider water quality issues only in the case of an exchange whereby water
was being actively substituted into the stream for the use of other
appropriators.57 An appropriator who alleges water quality impacts as a
result of appropriative depletion, rather than substandard discharge or supply
water, receives no relief under the present system. 58 The court stated that
by requiring maintenance of sufficient volume in the stream to preserve the
effluent limits of a downstream appropriator, a water court effectively would
be creating a private instream flow right for waste dilution, which the
instream flow statute did not allow.50
The extent and nature of water quality considerations which are relevant
to diligence applications, exchanges, and applications to make conditional
rights absolute are at issue in a case litigated in Water Division No. 1 in
November, 1999.60 Additional issues related to the water quality
restrictions on exchanges were concurrently litigated in another case in
Water Division No. 1.61 The results of both cases will have important
ramifications for the relationship between water quality and water rights in
Colorado.
VB1. CONCLUSION
Presently in Colorado, it would seem, all avenues for environmental
protection in water rights cases lead back to the same intersection: the
explicit terms of the 1969 Act, and, in particular, its instream flow provision.
Attempts to import common law concepts or other non-statutory innovations
into water rights matters have generally hit a dead end. The cases make for
interesting reading, but the story has a tendency to come out the same every
time: environmental protection in water matters is what the legislature has
said that it is, nothing more and nothing less.

55. Id

56. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
57. Id. at 92.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 93.

60. Application for Finding of Reasonable Diligence and to Make Absolute a Conditional
Water Right, In re Application for Water Rights of the City and County of Denver, No. 96CW-145 (Cob. Water Court, Div. No. 1, June 28, 1996).
61. Motion by the City of Black Hawk to Consolidate for Trial All Water Quality Issues,
In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92-C W-168, No. 92-C W-059,
No. 94-CW-036 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 1, Apr. 17, 1998).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.
COLORADO WILD, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; and DANIEL GLICICMAN, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture of the UnitexIStates,
Defendants.
,
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
Colorado Wild, Incorporated brings this case to protect the Snake River, located in the
White River National Forest near Dillon. While it runs through a beautiful mountain valley near
the Arapahoe Basin and Keystone ski resorts, the Snake suffers from severe water pollution
problems caused by past mining activities in the area. A variety of government and private
efforts to clean up the Snake are underway. But the United States Forest Service recently
undercut these cleanup efforts by approving a water diversion project that would further degrade
the Snake. Colorado Wild brings this case to challenge the Forest Service's approval of that
project.
The Forest Service has approved a plan that would allow the operator of the Arapahoe
Basin Ski Area, Dundee Realty: Incorporated, to begin making artificial snow in quantities that

eventually would pennit skiing 11 months per year. The novelty of year-round skiing, however,
would come at a severe cost. By withdrawing large volumes of good quality water from a
tributary of the Snake, Dundee Realty's snowmaking project would significantly worsen water
pollution problems in the Snake. The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
has stated that by exacerbating its water quality problems, Dundee Realty would "frustrate and
impair" efforts to clean up the Snake River.
As described below, the Forest Service's approval of this plan for summer skiing violates
the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. § 16004 q., NFMA's
implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 2004 sm., and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et ses.
PARTIES

1.

Colorado Wild, Incorporated is a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting,

restoring and maintaining the ecological integrity of Colorado's national forests. This goal
includes limiting development of national forests to areas and to an intensity where fish habitat,
water quality, and other natural resources are not damaged. Colorado Wild members hike and
ski in the Snake River area near Arapahoe Basin. By degrading water quality and fish habitat,
the proposed snowmaking project would injure Colorado Wild members who use this area.
2.

Defendant United States Forest Service is the agency responsible for managing national

forest lands, including the White River National Forest where Arapahoe Basin is located. The
Forest Service has a duty to manage national forest lands in a manner consistent with federal law.

3.

Defendant Daniel Glickman is the Secretary of the United States Department of

Agriculture, and in that role is charged with managing national forest lands in ámannér that is
consistent with federal law. Secretary Glickman is sued in his official capacity only.
Collectively, Defendants Glickman and the United States Forest Service are referred to herein as
the "Forest Service."
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-

2202 (declaratory judgment action), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and 5
U.S.C. §§ 704, 706 (Administrative Procedure Act review).
5.

Venue is appropriate in this judicial district and in-this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b), because the events and omissions giving rise to these claims occurred in the District of
Colorado.
FACTS
General
6.

Arapahoe Basin operates on about 825 acres of the White River National Forest (the

"White River") near Dillon, Colorado. Dundee Realty runs the ski area under a special use
permit issued by the Forest Service in 1997. That permit expires in the year 2029. Arapahoe
Basin's special use permit requires Dundee Realty to prepare a new Master Development Plan
("MDP") for the ski area. The MDP, which must be approved by the Forest Service, describes
planned future development of Arapahoe Basin. Until recently, an MDP approved in 1982
governed the administration of Arapahoe Basin. ,

7.

On November 10, 1999, the Forest Service approved a new MDP for Arapahoe Basin.

Among other projects, the MDP authorizes Dundee Realty to install and operate a snowmaking
system (the "snowmaking project"). To make snow, this system would withdraw large quantities
of water from a stream adjacent to Arapahoe Basin, the North Fork of the Snake River (the
"North Fork"). The North Fork flows into the main stem of the Snake River (the "Snake"). See
map, attached as Exhibit 1.
8.

The Snake is heavily contaminated by acid mine drainage from past mining activities in

the area. Acid mine drainage is a font' of pollution that occurs when rainwater runoff leaches
toxic heavy metals from old mine sites and tailings piles. Acid mine drainage enters the Snake
upstream of its confluence with the North Fork, and has cOntaminated the Snake with a variety of
metals, including manganese, zinc, lead, copper and cadmium. As a result, the Snake violates
applicable state water quality standards for these metals.
9.

When the North Fork merges with the Snake, the North Fork's relatively clean water

dilutes the acid mine drainage in the Snake. As a result the North Fork's flow reduces the
concentration of toxic metals in the Snake downstream from their confluence. While much of
the Snake is too polluted to support aquatic life, some trout and other aquatic life are able to
survive in the Snake below its confluence with the North Fork.
10.

The Snake River's pollution problem has received a significant amount of attention and

study from federal, state and local governments. For example, the Colorado Division of
Minerals and Geology may attempt a demonstration project nearby that would prevent some of
this mine drainage from polluting the Snake. In addition, a group of citizens, businesses and
4

government agencies, including EPA, the Forest Service, and the Northwest Colorado Council of
Governments, has formed a task force to help clean up the Snake..

s.

•

11.

The Snowmaking System and its Imnacts

By reducing the North Fork's-flow, the snowmaking project will cause the concentration

of toxic metals in the part of the Snake that currently contains fish and aquatic life to increase
substantially. This increased concentration of pollutants will exacerbate the Snake's water
quality problems.
12.

EPA has stated that the snowmaking project will cause "a significant, measurable

degradation of water quality in the Snake River that will frustrate and impair both private and
taxpayer-funded efforts to reduce metals concentrations and restore the fishery on the Snake
River." January 3, 2000 letter from Carol Campbell, United States Environmental Protection
Agency to Martha Ketelle, United States Forest Service at 2, attached as Exhibit 2.
13.

The snowmaking project would be completed in two phases. In Phase 1, the system

would withdraw up to 25 percent of the North Fork's stream flow (about 90 acre feet of water
annually), which would generate enough snow to permit skiing at Arapahoe Basin each year
from October 1 until July 4. Phase 1 snowmaking withdrawals would cause metals
concentrations in the Snake to increase by as much as 6.5 percent. The Forest Service, however,
has not required Dundee Realty to undertake any specific mitigation measures that would prevent
this water quality degradation. Dundee Realty has indicated that it plans to move forward with
Phase 1 as soon as it obtains all required permits and approvals.
14.

Under Phase 2 of the snowmaking project, Dundee Realty would build an additional

water diversion system on the North Fork that would produce enough snow to permit siding at
Arapahoe Basin from early October through late August. Under Phase 2, the Forest Service

6

would allow Dundee Realty to withdraw as ninth as 349 acre feet of water per year from the
North Fork. These withdrawals could increase Snake River metals concentrations by over 12
percent. While the Forest Service has required Dundee Realty to undertake severn1 measures to
protect,water quality before implementing Phase 2, these measures are inadequate to protect the
Snake. See Ex. 2 at 3 (EPA criticism of mitigation measures). ' Dundee Realty would implement
Phase 2 as Arapahoe Basin's funding allowed.
15.

The nearby Keystone ski area, which is located on the Snake River 'downstream from its

confluence with the North Fork, is seeking approval from the United States Army Corps of
Engineers to expand its own snowmaking operations. Under this expansion, Keystone would
more than double the water it withdraws from the Snake for snowmaking. The combined
withdrawals planned by Keystone and Arapahoe Basin wduld, at times, remove half of the
Snake's water.
- Procedural History
16.

Before the Forest Service approved the MDP, Colorado Wild submitted comments

pointing out that the snowmaking project would violate the Clean Water Act, the National Forest
Management Act, and Forest Service regulations. When the Forest Service approved the MDP
on November 10, 1999, Colorado Wild timely filed an administrative appeal of that decision
under Part 215 of the Forest Service's regulations. 36 C.F.R. Part 215. On February 17, 2000,
the Forest Service denied Colorado Wild's administrative appeal. Colorado Wild therefore has
exhausted all available administrative remedies with regard to the claims asserted in this.
complaint.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Clean Water Act
A.

17.

Water Quality Standards

Congress passed the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in '1972 to "restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." CWA section 101(a), 33 •
U.S.C. § 1251(a). To help achieve this goal, the CWA requires each state to establish water
quality standards for its rivers, lakes and streams. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a). Water quality standards
define the state's goals for the quality of each waterbody. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.0(b),130.3. In
establishing water quality standards for a waterbody, a state assigns a particular "use or uses to
be made of the water," such as fish habitat, aquatic recreation; or drinking water supplies, and
then sets numeric or narrative criteria that will protect those uses. 40 C.F.R. § 130.3.
18.

The Snake River and the North Fork are classified for several uses, including cold water

aquatic life (such as trout fisheries) and recreation (such a:s swimming and fishing). 5 C.C.R. §
1002-33, Stream Classification and Water Quality Standards Table, Region 12, Blue River
Basin, Stream Segments 6, 8 ("Standards Table"); 5 C.C.R. §§ 1002-31.13(1)(a), 31.13(1)(c)(i).
The State of Colorado has concluded that because of acid mine drainage, the Snake does not
currently meet the applicable water quality standards to protect these classified uses.
13. , Antidegradation Requirements.

19.

Colorado regulations implementing the CWA require that:
"for all state surface waters existing classified uses and the level of water quality
necessary to protect such uses shall be maintained and protected. No further water
quality degradation is allowable which would interfere with or become injurious to these

/Th

uses. The classified uses shall be deemed protected if the narrative and numerical water
quality standards are not exceeded."
5 C.C.R. §§ 1002-31.8(1)(c). These requirements are part of Colorado's antidegradation rule,
which is a component of the state's water quality standards.
C.

20.

Clean Water Act Section 313

Section 313 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C:§ 1323, requires that every agency of the federal

government "(1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity
resulting. . . in the discharge or runoff of pollutants,

shall be subject to, and comply with, all

Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements. . . respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. . . ."
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). Section 313 bars the Forest Service from authorizing an activity that
would cause a violation of water quality standards, or exacerbate an existing water quality
standard violation.
National Forest Management Act

21.

NFMA requires that the Forest Service prepare long range land and resource management

plans, often referred to as Forest Plans, to govern activities on each national forest. NFMA and
its implementing regulations mandate that all Irlesource plans and permits, contracts, and other
instruments for the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands shall be consistent with
the [Forest Plans]." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (similar requirement).
22.

Forest Plans must protect streams and water quality on National Forests, see, cs L, 36

C.F.R. §§ 219.27(a)(1), (a)(4), and provide for compliance with the Clean Water Act. 36 C.F.R.

9

§ 219.23(d). The White River's current Forest Plan requires the Forest Service to:
"Nmprove or maintain water quality to meet State water quality standards ....Shortterm or temporary failure to meet some parameters of the State standard, 'such as
increased sediment from road crossing construction or water resource development may
be permitted in special cases."
Land and Resource Management Plan - White River National Forest at 111-45. I
23.

Similarly, the Forest Service's regulations mandate that all 'special use permits allowing

activity on national forest land contain terms and conditions to require compliance with
applicable state water quality standards. 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C). Once approved by the
Forest Service, Arapahoe Basin's MDP became part of its special use permit.
„ FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATIONS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT
24.

The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 are incorporated by reference.

25.

The Forest Service's approval of the MDP fails to require the improvement or

maintenance of water quality in the Snake to meet Colorado water quality standards. See
Standards Table; 5 C.C.R. §§ 1002-31.8(1)(c). In approving the MDP, the Forest Service did not
indicate that the snowmaking project represents a "special case[ ]" that would justify a "[s]hortterm or temporary failure" to satisfy water quality standards. As a result, the MDP approval is
inconsistent with the express requirements of the White River's Forest Plan and therefore
violates NFMA and its implementing regulations. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e).

,
1

The Forest Service currently is in the process of revising the White River's Forest Plan. See White River
National Forest website, http://vvww.fs.fed.us/r2/whiteriver/planning.html.
10

26.

The Forest Service's approval of the MDP also violates section 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C) of its

regulations, because the MDP does not include provisions requiring the snowmaking project to
comply with applicable state water quality standards. 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C).

"..

,

i' I
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
 VIOLATION OF CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 313
27.

The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-23 are incorporated by reference.

28.

In approving the snowmaking project, the Forest Service failed to require that it comply

with Colorado's water quality standards. See Standards Table; 5 C.C.R. §§ 1002-31.8(1)(c).
29.

By authorizing an activity that would not comply with applicable water quality standards,

the Forest Service has violated section 313 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1323.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Colorado Wild respectfully requests that this Court grant it the following
relief:
(1)

A declaration that the Forest Service's approval of the MOP violated NFMA, 16

U.S.C. § 1604(i), and sections 219.10(e) and 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C) of the Forest Service's
regulations, 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.10(e), 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C);
(2)

A declaration that the Forest Service's approval of the MDP violated section 313 of

the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323;
(3)

A remand to the Forest Service of its decision to approve the MDP;

(4)

An injunction barring the Forest Service from allowing construction or operation

of any part of the snowmaking project until such time as the Forest Service complies with
NFMA, its implementing regulations, and the CWA;
(5)

A decision to retain jurisdiction over this case to ensure compliance with this

Court's decree;

(Th
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(6)

An award to Colorado Wild of its attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing this

action; and
(7)

Such other relief as this Court deems proper.

Dated this

day of April, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,

Robert B. Wiygul
Michael S. Freeman
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
1631 Glenarm Place, Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 623-9466
Attorneys for Plaintiff Colorado Wild, Inc.

Plaintiff's Address:
Colorado Wild, Inc.
1030 Pearl Street, #9
Denver, CO 80203
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